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By: Ishaq Braimah PhD.
The revelation of COCOBOD’s staggering $1.35 billion trading loss, initially presented in
President Mahama’s State of the Nation address and subsequently confirmed by the Finance
Minister, has left me utterly bewildered.
To hear of $840 million lost in 2025 cocoa sales,
compounded by a projected $495 million loss in 2026, is not merely alarming, it’s a national
crisis.
This is, to my knowledge, unprecedented in Ghana’s history and demands immediate,
decisive action.
What’s even more troubling is the conspicuous absence of any firm commitment from either
the President or the Finance Minister regarding a thorough investigation, punitive measures,
and safeguards to prevent future occurrences.
Let’s be clear: we’re talking about 1.4% of
Ghana’s GDP, or roughly 80% of COCOBOD’s 2024 total revenue.
The Ghanaian people, who
have been so grievously shortchanged, deserve to know who is responsible.
The official explanation centers on the non-delivery of 333,797 metric tonnes of cocoa, sold at
$2,600 per tonne in 2024, now slated for delivery in 2025. With current world market prices
soaring between $6,500 and over $10,000 per tonne, COCOBOD’s own conservative estimate
suggests a $4,000 per tonne loss if the deferred contracts are honored.
A simple check of the IMF’s Primary Commodity Price analysis reveals that cocoa prices have
consistently remained above $4,000 per tonne since November 2023, peaking at $10,412 on
December 31, 2024. So, where does this $2,600 figure originate?
During the previous NPP administration, COCOBOD secured a producer price exceeding
$3,200 per tonne for farmers. This implies a higher average selling price, from which
operational costs were deducted before the 70% farmer payout.
Again, where does the $2,600 figure originate?
COCOBOD’s explanations, attributing the loss to poor forecasting, production shortfalls,
smuggling, or illegal mining, are woefully inadequate. While crop forecasting is indeed an
imperfect science, it’s inexcusable for professionals entrusted with national assets to
overcommit by 60% of actual production.
Even if they did, why would the 2024 portion of the
contract be priced so much HIGHER than the 2025 rollover?
After careful consideration, a disturbing rationale emerges: did COCOBOD officials, in a bid
to bolster the NPP’s electoral prospects, deliberately delay shipping low-priced contracts while
selling new ones at higher spot prices? This would have allowed the government to announce
inflated farmer prices.
Was this a calculated move to sabotage the incoming NDC
administration with a massive revenue deficit and depressed farmer prices? Was this merely
recklessness, or was it a deliberate act of sabotage?
Regardless, the consequences for cocoa farmers, taxpayers, and the nation are severe. I implore
the government to launch an immediate and transparent investigation.
Those responsible for this colossal $1.35 billion loss, whether through incompetence or malicious intent, must be
held accountable